Y Combinator · Startup School 2026
“The Future Was Supposed to Be Faster”
The Boom Supersonic founder explains why aviation stalled for 50 years — and how a cardboard mock-up became the first privately built jet to break the sound barrier.
Tap a timestamp pill below to jump the video to that moment.
The problem
Why the world stopped getting faster
Blake Scholl opens with the line “Houston, we have a problem” — and he means it literally. In 1969, the same year humans walked on the moon, Concorde took its first flight. Half a century later, we can do neither. The moon programme has been cancelled and restarted twice, and the last supersonic passenger service retired in 2003. The future that engineers of that era promised never arrived.
“In 1969, we landed on the moon and the same year we flew Concord…”
Scholl makes the stagnation concrete with two slides: a Boeing 707 from the 1960s next to a 787, the newest widebody airliner, launched more than twenty years ago. You cannot spot the difference, he says. The 787 does not fly any faster. It does not make the world any more accessible. The commercial aviation industry spent half a century optimising for seat costs and fuel burn, and in doing so quietly abandoned the goal of going faster.
The same inertia shows up in defence procurement, in spacecraft development, in infrastructure. The problem is not that physics changed — the problem is that the organisations and incentives built around high-stakes hardware became so risk-averse that genuine speed regressed. That is the gap Boom Supersonic set out to close, starting in 2014, not with government funding and not inside an incumbent manufacturer, but as a startup.
How they solve it
From cardboard mock-up to Mach 1.1 — and on to Overture
Boom’s YC application in 2014 included a supersonic airliner mock-up built from cardboard, plywood, and seats sourced from Office Depot. People laughed. Who names an airplane startup after the sound of an explosion? But the team treated ridicule as a filter — only people who could see past the cardboard were the right early customers, partners, and hires — and kept building. The first real prototype, called XB-1, began life as “baby boom,” a one-third-scale demonstrator designed to answer the engineering questions Boom could not answer on paper. Last year, XB-1 became the first independently developed jet to break the sound barrier, hitting Mach 1.1 over the Mojave Desert.
“That’s right. This is a supersonic airliner mockup made of cardboard, plywood and seats from Office Depot…”
XB-1 also proved something that had been theorised but never demonstrated at scale: mach cutoff. The sonic boom a supersonic aircraft generates does not always reach the ground. If the airplane is at the right altitude and flying at the right speed relative to the winds, the boom refracts upward and curves back toward the sky before it reaches anyone’s ears. Boom flew XB-1 through the sound barrier six times in two flights and produced no audible boom on the ground — turning what had been the political and regulatory killer of supersonic travel into a solved engineering problem. As Scholl puts it: “It’s like if a tree falls in a forest and no one’s there to hear it.”
“XB-1 broke the sound barrier six times. Each time no audible sonic boom on the ground…”
With the physics and prototype work behind them, Boom turned to Overture — the full-size passenger airliner — and immediately hit the second hard problem: financing a hardware programme that will cost billions of dollars and cannot predict its exact timeline. Scholl’s answer was vertical integration. By choosing to build their own engine rather than sourcing one from an incumbent, Boom gained an unexpected revenue stream: the same supersonic engine, adapted slightly, can run as a natural gas power turbine on the ground. Boom calls it Superpower. The first Superpower turbine ships to its first customer in under twelve months, generating test data, manufacturing confidence, and capital — all before Overture has flown a single passenger.
“We discovered that because we had made a choice to vertically integrate our own propulsion…”
The Superpower move is not an accident of engineering — it is a deliberate strategy that echoes lessons Scholl took from early Amazon. He worked with Jeff Bezos in his early twenties, managing a $300 million P&L at 23 or 24. What he saw Amazon do unusually well was build software that fit the business “like a glove,” creating structural advantages competitors could not replicate by buying off-the-shelf tools. Boom’s vertical integration of propulsion is the hardware equivalent: you cannot buy a supersonic engine; you have to build it. And having built it, you own something nobody else has.
Takeaway
The quick version
- Commercial aviation got slower after Concorde — the 787 looks identical to the 707 and does not fly faster. Regulatory risk-aversion and incumbent incentives entrenched the stagnation.
- Boom solved the two showstopper problems: sonic boom (mach cutoff lets the boom U-turn before it hits the ground) and financing (sell the supersonic engine as a ground turbine to fund the airplane).
- XB-1 breaking the sound barrier as the first independently built jet to do so proves that ambitious hardware can be developed outside government programmes — if founders are willing to build the sub-scale demonstrator first.
- If something is calling you, start building. Scholl’s advice: self-belief comes late, from doing the work — not from feeling ready in advance.
“I think it’s important to create things that we want to exist in the world and I think it’s important to create things that inspire other creators.”— Blake Scholl, Boom Supersonic
The flight path from cardboard mock-up to Mach 1.1 took twelve years and ran through every constraint that stops most founders. Scholl’s point isn’t that the obstacles weren’t real — it’s that they were learnable, one prototype at a time.